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A VAGUE LAW IN A SMARTPHONE WORLD:  
LIMITING THE SCOPE OF UNAUTHORIZED 
ACCESS UNDER THE COMPUTER FRAUD 
AND ABUSE ACT 
ANDREW T. HERNACKI* 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) broadly criminalizes unauthorized 
access to computers and digital information, but how far should these federal 
prohibitions reach into the mobile data space?  As smartphones and mobile 
applications continually redefine the digital landscape, attempts to apply the decades-
old anti-hacking statute in this new territory have created potentially disturbing 
precedent.   
Courts and critics have struggled to interpret the arguably vague and ambiguous 
provisions of the CFAA and have turned to contract law, agency law, and computer 
science for guidance.  This Comment contends that the contract- and agency-based 
interpretations implicate constitutional vagueness concerns, and the code-based 
approach does not sufficiently address “insider” misuse of information.  In the context 
of mobile application data privacy, the shortcomings of current interpretations 
necessitate a narrower view of unauthorized access.  By limiting liability to only 
traditional notions of hacking and serious misuse of information, the CFAA can better 
serve its original and primary purpose:  punishing criminal computer hackers and 
those who abuse legitimate access rights. 
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“I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” 
–Thomas Watson, Chairman of IBM, 1943 
INTRODUCTION 
Cell phones are ubiquitous.1  As handheld devices become 
increasingly affordable and network service providers continue to 
                                                          
 1. According to the wireless industry trade association, CTIA, the wireless 
penetration rate, which measures the total active devices over the total U.S. 
population, reached 102.4% in 2011.  Wireless Quick Facts, CELLULAR TELECOMMS. 
INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/10323 (last 
visited May 5, 2012). 
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expand cellular and data bandwidth, advanced mobile devices, or 
smartphones, have become similarly widespread.2  According to one 
recent study by the Pew Research Center, eighty-eight percent of 
Americans own some kind of cell phone, while forty-six percent of 
Americans own a smartphone.3  One of the most common and 
distinctive features of today’s smartphones is mobile applications, or 
“apps.”  Apple’s often-quoted and parodied advertising slogan, 
“there’s an app for that,” seemingly encapsulates the current panoply 
of apps across numerous genres available to smartphone users.4  With 
the meteoric rise of smartphones and app usage over the last few 
years,5 concerns over data privacy in the mobile space have garnered 
similar attention from legislators,6 regulators,7 and the general 
public.8 
Despite increasing legislative and media attention on mobile data 
privacy, many app developers have not adopted self-regulatory 
measures to protect user privacy.9  A recent Wall Street Journal 
investigation of the 101 most popular mobile apps on the market 
revealed that forty-five did not include privacy policies of any kind.10  
                                                          
 2. See 2010 Mobile Year in Review Report, COMSCORE (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/2010_M
obile_Year_in_Review (describing consistent growth in percentages of web-enabled 
phones, unlimited data plans, smartphone ownership, and 3G/4G phone 
ownership). 
 3. Aaron Smith, 46% of American Adults Are Smartphone Owners, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/ 
Smartphone%20ownership%202012.pdf.  
 4. Perhaps in response to widespread parody, Apple recently obtained a 
trademark for “there’s an app for that.”  THERE’S AN APP FOR THAT, Registration 
No. 3,884,408.  
 5. Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple’s App Store Downloads Top 25 Billion 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/03/05Apples-App-Store-
Downloads-Top-25-Billion.html. 
 6. See, e.g., Protecting Mobile Privacy:  Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones, and 
Your Privacy:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“The collection, use and storage of location and other 
sensitive personal information [from mobile devices] has serious implications 
regarding the privacy rights and personal safety of American consumers.”). 
 7. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (proposing 
new privacy frameworks for mobile companies). 
 8. See, e.g., Press Release, Apple, Inc., supra note 5 (discussing public comments 
regarding concerns for better privacy protection). 
 9. See Tanzina Vega, Industry Tries to Streamline Privacy Policies for Mobile Users, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at B7 (describing one company’s effort to solve the problem of 
non-existent and confusing mobile privacy policies by creating a tool that generates 
boilerplate privacy policies for app developers). 
 10. Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps are Watching You, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 18, 2010, at C1.  In response to this study, California Attorney General Kamala 
Harris conducted an investigation and recently reached an agreement with Apple, 
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Moreover, fifty-six apps transmitted the unique device identification 
(UDID), a serial-like number that can be linked to other user data,11 
to third-party companies without the users’ awareness or consent.12  
Amidst these growing concerns over protecting users’ information, 
both law enforcement and private citizens have looked for new ways 
to bring their concerns before the judiciary.13  Some of these novel 
approaches, however, may push the envelope too far. 
App users alleging privacy infringement have recently sought 
redress under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act14 (CFAA), a federal 
criminal statute originally designed to combat “juvenile computer 
hacker” attacks against the federal government’s computers.15  
Despite the statute’s narrow origin, the CFAA now broadly 
criminalizes and permits private civil actions against anyone who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . (C) information from any 
protected computer.”16  Typical criminal and civil cases under the 
CFAA involve traditional notions of hacking government computers,17 
stealing trade secrets to establish competing businesses,18 or large-
                                                          
Google, and several other big players in the mobile space to amend the companies’ 
policies regarding privacy policies.  Geoffrey A. Fowler, Tech Giants Agree on Deal on 
Privacy Policies for Apps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, at B4.  Notably, Attorney General 
Harris’s investigation revealed that twenty-two of the thirty most downloaded apps 
still lacked privacy policies.  Id. 
 11. Modern smartphones are equipped with this identification number that 
cannot be deleted from the device.  Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Unique Phone ID 
Numbers Explained, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2010, 9:40 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/12/19/unique-phone-id-numbers-explained.  
Although the numbers by themselves do not identify any personal information about 
the user, the primary concern with these identifiers is that they could potentially be 
tied to other user metadata, including geo-location data or user-account data, to 
create a personally-identifiable profile of the user.  Id. 
 12. Thurm & Kane, supra note 10. 
 13. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (describing pending 
investigations and class action cases stemming from mobile app data privacy 
concerns); see also Cyber Crime:  Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect 
Cyber Space and Combat Emerging Threats:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.) 
(proposing further expansion of the CFAA by increasing criminal penalties and 
making it easier for prosecutors to bring cases against individuals and co-
conspirators).  
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 15. Sarah Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 665 (2009).  
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
 17. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming 
the criminal conviction of a Cornell student who used a school computer to crash 
university, governmental, and military servers around the country). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *1 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (describing the section of the CFAA that criminalizes 
theft of confidential documents and trade secrets). 
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scale data theft via malicious code or “botnets.”19  Law enforcement20 
and classes of app users,21 however, now argue that app developers 
and mobile advertisers can be liable under the CFAA when an app 
merely obtains information from the user’s smartphone for targeted 
advertisements and marketing analytics.22  The CFAA does not define 
what it means to access a computer without authorization, and courts 
continue to struggle to interpret these vague provisions.23 
This Comment will argue that, in the context of mobile app data 
privacy cases, broad interpretations of the CFAA’s unauthorized 
access provisions violate the vagueness doctrine and render the 
statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.  As the 
vagueness doctrine enables courts to adopt narrow interpretations of 
vague statutes, courts should limit application of the CFAA to 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., Indictment at 15–16, 26–27, United States v. Ancheta, No. CR 05-
1060 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (charging defendant with CFAA violations for operating and 
profiting from a botnet—an army of infected computers—used to send malicious 
spam and conduct distributed denial of service attacks against various websites), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cyberlaw/usanchetaind.pdf. 
 20. See Pandora Media, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement Under 
the Securities Act of 1933, at 27–28 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1230276/000119312511087171/ds1a.htm#toc119636_19 (disclosing that  
federal prosecutors are investigating the use of app-obtained information as 
potentially violative of the CFAA); Amir Efrati et al., Mobile-App Makers Face U.S. 
Privacy Investigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011, at B1 (discussing an investigation by 
federal prosecutors in New Jersey into mobile app data collection and disclosure). 
 21. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106865, at *35–37 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (alleging CFAA violations against 
Apple and several mobile advertisers for the unauthorized acquisition of apps, 
smartphone UDIDs, and geo-location data for marketing and advertising purposes); 
Hines v. Openfeint, Inc., No. CV113084, 2011 WL 2471471 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2011) 
(alleging that a mobile-gaming-network company accessed, without authorization, 
users’ smartphone UDIDs, Facebook/Twitter profiles, and other purportedly 
personal information for marketing analytics and targeted advertising profiles); In re 
Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2011) 
(consolidating six cases arising out of allegations of Google’s “improper business 
practices”); see also Complaint ¶¶ 39–44, Jeffreys v. Google, Inc., No. 9:2011cv80676 
(S.D. Fla. June 9, 2011), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/florida/flsdce/9:2011cv80676/380889/1 (alleging that Google, through its 
Android mobile operating system, acquired personal information from users’ 
smartphones without authorization, in violation of the CFAA). 
 22. Hines, 2011 WL 2471471, at *10–12. 
 23. Some courts have resolved such ambiguities by invalidating overly-broad 
language and substituting narrower interpretations, applying the “vagueness 
doctrine.”  Statutes that are so vague they are indecipherable to the public are 
especially prime for application of the doctrine.  See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:  
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1596, 1619–28 (2003) (comparing “virtual-world” and “physical-world” 
interpretations of “access” and “authorization”).  Professor Kerr also notes that “the 
few courts to have interpreted access have reached inconsistent conclusions” and 
“[c]ourts have faced even greater difficulties trying to interpret the meaning of 
authorization.”  Id. at 1628.   
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prohibit only traditional notions of hacking and serious misuse of 
information.   
Part I explains the early development of the CFAA as an anti-
hacking statute, the current scope of activities triggering liability 
under the statute, and the three leading interpretations of 
unauthorized access.  Part II argues that broad interpretations of 
unauthorized access in the context of mobile apps can render the 
CFAA unconstitutionally void for vagueness.  Part III analyzes how 
courts should limit application of the CFAA to cases of traditional 
hacking and misuse of information.  This Comment concludes that, 
except for instances of hacking or serious misuse of information, 
mobile app data privacy cases are improper under the CFAA, 
especially in light of proposed privacy-specific rules and legislation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Evolution of the CFAA 
The initial goal of the CFAA was modest:  protect information 
stored on computers owned by the federal government from damage 
and theft by outside intruders.24  As the computer industry continues 
to expand and the threat of hackers pervades virtually every 
interaction with the digital world, this formerly-little-known anti-
hacking statute has grown into a multi-faceted tool with a potentially 
limitless scope.25 
1. Initial enactment and early development of the CFAA 
Over the last three decades, the CFAA has evolved considerably 
from its initial enactment.  The CFAA’s first iteration was enacted as 
part of the omnibus Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198426 
(CCCA), which included the first federal computer crime statute.27  
The CCCA introduced three new federal computer crimes designed 
                                                          
 24. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (2007) [hereinafter PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES] (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
docs/ccmanual.pdf. 
 25. See id. at 2–3 (describing the steady expansion of causes of action under the 
CFAA through numerous amendments over the last twenty-five years). 
 26. Pub. L. NO. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2006)). 
 27. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3692 
(recognizing the absence of federal computer crime legislation and acknowledging 
how, prior to this enactment, law enforcement relied primarily on wire- and mail-
fraud statutes to attempt to combat computer crimes committed with computers); see 
also PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 24, at 1 (discussing same).   
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to protect the burgeoning universe of federal systems controlled by 
and stored on computers.28  While all of the new offenses applied to a 
person who “knowingly accesses a computer without authorization, or 
having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity 
such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does 
not extend,”29 each provision criminalized conduct affecting a distinct 
federal interest. 
The first offense created under the CCCA prohibited accessing a 
computer to obtain national security information that could be used 
to injure the United States.30  The second portion of the CCCA 
criminalized accessing a computer to obtain sensitive information 
from a financial institution or consumer-reporting agency.31  Finally, 
the CCCA criminalized accessing a computer if such conduct would 
affect the government’s use of that computer or government 
operations.32  These new provisions sought to protect national 
defense, financial information, and the use of government property.33 
Congress’s first attempt at creating a unified computer crime 
statute, however, was limited to only harm resulting from 
unauthorized access.  Accordingly, the statute left two significant 
regulatory gaps:  (1) the statute did not cover individuals who caused 
harm with authorized access; and (2) it failed to address access by 
proxy or a co-conspirator.34  To remedy these loopholes, Congress 
amended § 1030 in 1986 to create the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act but limited it to only those crimes implicating a compelling 
federal interest.35  The 1986 act attempted to remedy the misuse-of-
legitimate-access problem by adding the phrase “exceeds authorized 
access,” thereby criminalizing any access, including unknowing 
access, which even minimally steps over the line of authorized 
                                                          
 28. See Boyer, supra note 15, at 665–66 (noting that the CCCA was intended to 
“protect only the most vital federal interests” and not to broadly criminalize 
computer fraud affecting interstate commerce).  
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(3) (Supp. II 1985) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 
1030 (2006)). 
 30. See Boyer, supra note 15, at 665 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)). 
 31. See id. at 665–66 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)). 
 32. See id. at 666 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3)). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6–7, 21–22 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3689, 3692, 3707.  See generally Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 
1986:  A Measured Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453 (1990) 
(discussing scope and structure of the 1984 Act and summarizing policy 
considerations behind both the 1984 act and the subsequent 1986 amendments). 
 34. Branden Darden, Note, Definitional Vagueness in the CFAA:  Will Cyberbullying 
Cause the Supreme Court to Intervene?, 13 SMU TECH. L. REV. 329, 331 (2009). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)); see also 
Darden, supra note 34, at 331–32. 
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access.36  This small phrase would later prove to have widespread 
interpretive problems.37 
In 1994, Congress amended the CFAA to expand the statute 
beyond the criminal sector and add a private right of action.38  This 
civil analogue permits not only injunctive relief, but also equitable 
relief for violations of the statute that result in damage or loss.39  This 
change, in conjunction with additional amendments to § 
1030(a)(5),40 shifted the focus of the statute from the technical ideas 
of computer access to an individual’s intent and the scope of the 
harm caused.41 
The Economic Espionage Act of 199642 (EEA) continued the 
expansion of the CFAA.  While prior versions of the statute were 
purposefully limited to unauthorized access of only federal-interest 
information, such as financial records or national security data,43 the 
EEA expanded the scope of § 1030(a)(2) to now include obtaining—
and simply reading44—“any information of any kind so long as the 
conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.”45  In 
addition, the EEA added a new computer extortion provision, 
bolstered various misdemeanor provisions with felony-triggering 
conduct, and expanded the scope of “harm” to include non-monetary 
damage such as “physical injury to any person.”46  Further, the EEA 
replaced references to “federal interest” computers with a class of 
                                                          
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006)). 
 37. See infra Part I.B (detailing three competing approaches to interpreting 
unauthorized access). 
 38. Darden, supra note 34, at 332. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006)). 
 40. The 1996 amendment to § 1030(a)(5) was intended “to further protect 
computers and computer systems covered by the statute from damage both by 
outsiders, who gain access to a computer without authorization, and by insiders, who 
intentionally damage a computer.”  S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 9–10 (1996), available at 
1996 WL 492169, at *9; see also Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1566 (2010) (explaining that this amendment 
expanded liability-triggering actions to include both accidental and non-negligent 
damage to computers). 
 41. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101, 125–26 
(2001). 
 42. Pub. L. NO. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). 
 43. Darden, supra note 34, at 331. 
 44. EEA tit. II, 110 Stat. at 3491. 
 45. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1567 (noting that Congress “effectively criminalized all 
interstate hacking” with this amendment because even reading system prompts or 
messages would reveal information to someone without authorized access).  
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2006)); see Kerr, supra note 40, at 1567. 
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“protected computers,” a change that, as discussed below, would have 
a dramatic impact on the scope of the statute.47 
2. Current actions triggering liability under the CFAA 
The current version of the CFAA provides for criminal and civil 
liability when an individual intentionally “accesse[s] a computer 
without authorization or exceed[s] authorized access” and engages in 
one of seven types of prohibited conduct.48  Section 1030(a) 
proscribes these seven actions:  (1) obtaining any restricted 
government information or information protected for reasons of 
national defense;49 (2) using interstate communication to obtain any 
information from any protected computer;50 (3) accessing a 
computer owned or used by the federal government;51 (4) 
fraudulently obtaining anything of value from a protected computer 
unless the value is less than $5000 in a one-year period;52 (5) 
damaging a protected computer or data stored therein;53 (6) 
trafficking in passwords or similar information in certain situations;54 
and (7) threatening to cause damage or obtain information from a 
protected computer with intent to extort money or anything of 
value.55   
Section 1030(b) punishes any attempts or conspiracies to commit 
the proscribed actions, while § 1030(c) outlines criminal sanctions, 
and § 1030(d) authorizes the Secret Service and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to investigate violations of the prohibited conduct.56  
Section 1030(e) provides definitions of some statutory terms (with 
some notable absences), and § 1030(f) exempts “lawfully authorized” 
federal or state law enforcement or intelligence-related 
investigations.57   
Section 1030(g) comprises the private right of action, specifically 
providing that “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of 
a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the 
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or 
                                                          
 47. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the virtually limitless scope of the CFAA’s 
jurisdiction over computers connected to the Internet).  
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(7) (2006). 
 49. Id. § 1030(a)(1). 
 50. Id. § 1030(a)(2). 
 51. Id. § 1030(a)(3). 
 52. Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
 53. Id. § 1030(a)(5). 
 54. Id. § 1030(a)(6). 
 55. Id. § 1030(a)(7). 
 56. Id. § 1030(b)–(d). 
 57. Id. § 1030(e)–(f). 
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other equitable relief.”58  To bring an action for civil relief, a party 
must establish two essential elements:  (1) a violation of one of the 
seven proscribed activities in § 1030(a) resulting in damage or loss, 
and (2) a violation must involve one of the five aggravating factors 
delineated in § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V).59  Despite this somewhat 
confusing statutory structure, a civil claim may be brought under any 
of the delineated causes of action so long as the party demonstrates at 
least one aggravating factor.60  The civil right of action also includes a 
two-year statute of limitations period and bars product-liability claims 
for negligent design or manufacture of a computer.61   
3. Current scope of the CFAA 
In 1996, Congress replaced the idea of a “federal interest” 
computer with a new class of “protected computer.”62  The phrase 
“protected computer” sparked some initial interpretive problems, but 
it is now viewed very broadly.  Currently, a “protected computer” 
means a computer that is either  
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United 
States Government . . . ; or (B) [] used in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce or communication, including a computer 
located outside the United States that is used in a manner that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the 
United States.63  
This definition marked a significant change from the pre-1996 idea 
of “federal interest” computers, which triggered liability under the 
statute only when a violator “used” computers in two or more states.64  
                                                          
 58. Id. § 1030(g).   
 59. Id.  The aggravating factors are:   
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at 
least $5,000 in value; (II) the modification or impairment, or potential 
modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, 
treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any 
person; (IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting a 
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in 
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national 
security. 
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V). 
 60. P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 
F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We do not read section 1030(g)’s language that the 
claim must involve one or more of the numbered subsections of subsection 
[(c)(4)(A)(i)] as limiting relief to claims that are entirely based only on subsections 
[(a)(5)(A)–(C)], but, rather, as requiring that claims brought under other sections 
must meet, in addition, one of the five numbered [(c)(4)(A)(i)] ‘tests.’”).  
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).  
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2006)). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
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The current definition, with the inclusion of “or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce or communication,” effectively expands the 
scope of the statute to mirror the breadth of the Commerce Clause.65   
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress can 
regulate local economic activities so long as there is a rational basis 
and the activities are among an economic class of activities that 
substantially affect commerce, even in the aggregate.66  Accordingly, 
the addition of the congressionally-recognized term of art “affecting” 
within the definition of “protected computer” broadens the CFAA’s 
reach to every computer that can be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause.67  Recently, several federal courts of appeals have recognized 
the broad reach of the CFAA as commensurate with Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction and have accordingly rejected jurisdictional 
challenges to CFAA enforcement actions.68 
Additionally, the CFAA’s definition includes foreign commerce,69 
stretching the definition of “protected computer” to the point where 
it ostensibly just means “computer.”70  The CFAA, however, defines 
“computer” very broadly and excludes only typewriters and hand-held 
                                                          
§ 1030 (2006)). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006); see Kerr, supra note 
40, at 1569–71 (explaining that computers connected to the Internet need not be 
used in interstate commerce to fall within the scope of the CFAA).  
 66. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2005) (holding that marijuana 
is a fungible commodity, albeit an illegal one, such that Congress can regulate even 
local cultivation because the aggregate effect of home growing could substantially 
affect interstate commerce). 
 67. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1570; see also PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra 
note 24, at 2 (acknowledging that the scope of “protected computer” mirrors “the 
full extent of Congress’s commerce power”). 
 68. See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a 
constitutional challenge that the CFAA did not cover the computer network of the 
not-for-profit Salvation Army, and explaining that the computers’ connection to the 
Internet rendered them “part of ‘a system that is inexorably intertwined with 
interstate commerce’ and thus properly within the realm of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power” (quoting United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 
2006))); United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming a 
conviction under § 1030 for damaging an emergency response communications 
system of Madison, Wisconsin, and rejecting the argument that the intrastate nature 
of the attack placed the defendant’s actions outside the CFAA’s jurisdiction on the 
grounds that Congress can regulate conduct affecting a computer once the 
computer itself is used in interstate commerce). 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he term ‘protected computer’ means a 
computer . . . which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 70. Kerr, supra note 40, at 1571; see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 
367, 373–75 (D. Conn. 2001) (acknowledging Congress’s power to apply its statutes 
extraterritorially and finding the plain language of § 1030(e)(2)(B) to clearly extend 
the CFAA to foreign computers). 
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calculators.71  Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit decided to explicitly and unequivocally include even 
basic cell phones—those that only make calls and send text messages  
without Internet or app functionality—within the definition of 
“computer.”72  This broad definition, both in the statute and in 
courts’ interpretations, means that unauthorized access of nearly 
every computational device, including smartphones, would fall under 
the CFAA. 
B. Three Approaches to Interpreting Definitional Ambiguities and Omissions 
of the CFAA 
The CFAA does not define several key terms.  Most notably, the 
statute fails to define “access” and “authorization,”73 absences that 
have drawn academic criticism and led to judicial uncertainty.74  
Further, the CFAA provides only a vague and arguably circular 
definition for “exceeds authorized access,” namely that it “means to 
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain 
or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not so 
entitled to obtain or alter.”75  Accordingly, courts and academics have 
struggled to interpret these undefined and vague provisions and have 
looked to other areas of the law for guidance.76  Over the past decade, 
                                                          
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (defining “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic, 
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing 
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions . . . includ[ing] any data storage facility or 
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such 
device, but . . . not includ[ing] an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable 
hand held calculator, or other similar device”); see Kerr, supra note 40, at 1571 (citing 
Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496) (commenting that “[e]verything else with a microchip or that 
permits digital storage is, arguably, covered”). 
 72. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902–03 (8th Cir.) (affirming a 
sentence enhancement for using a basic cell phone in the commission of 
transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in criminal 
sexual activity), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2977 (2011). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). 
 74. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(employing a variety of statutory construction techniques—including dictionary 
definitions and the rule of lenity—to reject an interpretation of unauthorized access 
grounded in agency-law principles); United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the CFAA’s failure to define authorization and 
interpreting it according to the nebulous idea of “expected norms of intended use or 
the nature of the relationship established between the computer owner and the 
user”); see also Kerr, supra note 23, at 1619–24 (differentiating between “virtual” and 
“physical” notions of access and authorization). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). 
 76. See, e.g., Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye:  Unauthorized Access, Trespass, and 
Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395, 1398–99 (2007) (proposing a view of unauthorized access 
statutes grounded in classical trespass law); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Death of 
Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 344 (2000) (opposing a property-rights 
oriented approach in favor of a more restrictive view of unauthorized access to avoid 
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three distinct approaches have emerged for how to interpret and 
apply what it means to access a computer without, or in excess of, 
authorization:  (1) the contract-based approach; (2) the agency-based 
approach; and (3) the code-based approach. 
1. The contract-based approach 
Under the contract-based approach, one “exceeds authorized 
access,” in violation of the CFAA, when accessing a computer in such 
a way that violates an existing “contract.”77  In this context, “contract” 
includes not only traditional contracts, such as employment 
contracts78 or network service provider agreements,79 but also more 
informal agreements, including employer computer-use policies or 
other company handbooks.80 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United 
States v. Czubinski81 developed the contract-based approach, though 
only in dicta.  In Czubinski, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
employee signed a contract containing a policy of limiting access to 
IRS files for only “official purposes.”82  The court assumed, in dicta 
and without any additional explanation, that Czubinski’s perusal of 
files on the IRS database for personal reasons “unquestionably 
exceeded authorized access to a Federal interest computer.”83  While 
                                                          
economic waste). 
 77. Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2212 (2004) 
(explaining that a computer owner may control access by providing notice of terms 
of use); Nicholas R. Johnson, Note, “I Agree” to Criminal Liability:  Lori Drew’s 
Prosecution Under § 1030(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Why Every 
Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561, 570 (explaining that a 
computer owner may control access by a contract and that protections against 
unauthorized access derive from traditional contract law principles). 
 78. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (holding that breach of an employment-related confidentiality agreement 
exceeded authorized access, but not deciding whether the access itself was 
unauthorized). 
 79. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that Verio’s use of “search robots” on Register.com’s 
“WHOIS” domain-name registration database breached Register.com’s policy 
forbidding the use of “WHOIS” data for marketing purposes and thereby violated § 
1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(5)(a)), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Am. Online, Inc. v. 
LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that LCGM violated § 
1030(a)(2)(C) when it used “extractor software” to harvest e-mail addresses from 
AOL for the purpose of sending bulk-spam advertisements in violation of AOL’s TOS 
agreement). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–65 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the conviction under the CFAA of a SSA teleservices agent who violated 
the SSA’s computer-use policy when he accessed the SSA database to obtain personal 
information of women in whom he was romantically interested), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 2166 (2011). 
 81. 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997).  
 82. Id. at 1071. 
 83. Id. at 1078. 
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the First Circuit continued to apply the contract-based approach in 
the employment law context,84 other courts and academics have also 
discussed the contract-based approach in website or network service 
provider terms-of-service (TOS) “clickwrap” agreements.85  Under this 
application, “a website owner or service provider can establish 
criminal liability through . . . [rarely read] terms of service,”86 
granting broad discretion to the owner or service provider to choose 
what might constitute a criminal violation of the CFAA.87 
The recent and tragic case United States v. Drew88 involved an 
attempted application of the contract-based approach to website TOS 
agreements.89  In Drew, Lori Drew was charged with violating § 
1030(a)(2)(C) for creating a fake profile on MySpace.com to contact 
and befriend thirteen-year-old Megan Meier.90  After several weeks of 
communicating with Meier through the fake profile of “Josh Evans,” 
Drew, posing as “Evans,” sent a message to Meier indicating that 
“Evans” no longer liked her and that “the world would be a better 
place without her in it.”91  That same day, Meier committed suicide.92  
Drew was then charged with violating § 1030(a)(2)(C) for 
unauthorized access because she had violated the Myspace TOS 
“contract” by creating the fake profile.93  The trial judge, Judge Wu, 
however, did not accept this novel approach and granted Drew’s 
motion for acquittal.94  In holding that violations of website TOS 
agreements would encourage discriminatory enforcement,95 Judge 
Wu stated that such an approach would “transform[] section 
1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that 
would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into 
misdemeanant criminals.”96 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
                                                          
 84. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that violation of a confidentiality agreement can constitute exceeding 
unauthorized access). 
 85. Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  How Computer Science 
Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 241 n.62 (2010) 
(defining a “clickwrap contract” as “one in which a computer user indicates assent 
with a mouse click rather than a signature”). 
 86. Id. at 241. 
 87. Id. at 242. 
 88. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 89. Id. at 457. 
 90. Id. at 452. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 452–53. 
 94. Id. at 467. 
 95. Id. at 463–65. 
 96. Id. at 466. 
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Circuit adopted another variation of the contract-based approach in 
United States v. Rodriguez.97  In Rodriguez, a Social Security 
Administration (SSA) teleservices agent allegedly used his access to 
the SSA database to obtain information about women in whom he 
was romantically interested.98  Rodriguez, however, refused to sign an 
agreement acknowledging the SSA’s policy prohibiting access to SSA 
database information for a purpose other than a “business reason,” 
though the SSA reinforced its policy through mandatory training 
sessions, office notices, and a daily alert on company computers.99  
The court held that, even though there was no formal contract in 
place, violating a corporate computer-use policy can be sufficient to 
constitute “exceed[ing] authorized access” and, therefore, 
Rodriguez’s actions amounted to a criminal violation of § 
1030(a)(2)(B).100 
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified its position in United 
States v. Nosal.101  In Nosal, a former employee of an executive search 
firm allegedly convinced several current employees to access the 
firm’s proprietary executive database, in apparent violation of 
existing computer-use policies, to further the creation of his own 
competing firm.102  Notably, the district court found that Nosal’s 
conspirators had authority to obtain the allegedly proprietary 
information for legitimate business purposes and did not exceed 
authorized access even if they acted with fraudulent intent.103   
In reversing the district court’s decision, a panel of the Ninth 
Circuit held that “as long as the employee has knowledge of the 
employer’s limitations on that authorization, the employee ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ when the employee violates those limitations.”104  
However, the entire Ninth Circuit sitting en banc changed course 
and affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that “‘exceeds 
authorized access’ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of use 
restrictions.”105  The court’s holding has created a definitive circuit 
                                                          
 97. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 1260–61. 
 99. Id. at 1260. 
 100. Id. at 1263. 
 101. 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119 
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012). 
 102. Id. at 783. 
 103. Id. at 785 (discussing United States v. Nosal, No. C 08-0237-MHP, 2010 WL 
934257, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010)). 
 104. Id. at 788.  The court added “it is as simple as that.”  Id. 
 105. United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 
10, 2012) (en banc).  
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split with the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits,106 raising the 
distinct possibility of review by the Supreme Court.  In adopting a 
narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized access,” the court 
joined the ranks of numerous federal district courts and academics 
that have routinely criticized the contract-based approach,107 citing 
the rule of lenity108 as well as overbreadth and vagueness concerns.109 
2. The agency-based approach 
The agency-based approach employs common law agency tenets to 
argue that an agent acts “without authorization” when he breaches a 
state law duty of loyalty or fiduciary duty to the principal.110  The most 
common application of this approach occurs between employers and 
employees.111  The agency-based approach was introduced in Shurgard 
Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.112  In this case, plaintiff 
Shurgard alleged defendant Safeguard hired away Shurgard 
employees who had access to confidential business plans and other 
trade secrets.113  Shurgard argued the former employees were no 
longer its agents when they sent e-mails to their new employer 
“containing various trade secrets and proprietary information” 
                                                          
 106. See id. at *6 (refusing to adopt an interpretation of “exceeds authorized 
access” grounded in “culpable behavior” and commenting that other federal circuit 
courts have “failed to consider the effect on millions of ordinary citizens caused by 
the statue’s unitary definition”); see also id. at *10 (Silverman, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how the en banc majority’s decision is also at odds with the Eighth 
Circuit’s implicit adoption of the contract-based approach in United States v. 
Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121–22 (8th Cir. 2011)).   
 107.  See id. at *7 (majority opinion) (collecting cases holding that the CFAA does 
not prohibit unauthorized disclosure, misuse, or misappropriation of information). 
 108. Id. (reasoning that the rule of lenity necessitates a narrow interpretation of 
“exceeds unauthorized access” in order to ensure that both citizens and Congress will 
have fair notice of criminal conduct under the law as to avoid “unintentionally 
turn[ing] ordinary citizens into criminals”). 
 109. See id. at *6 (reasoning that criminalizing inherently transitory, and generally 
vague, terms of service agreements invites arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement); see also Chung, supra note 85, at 242–43 (noting that courts have 
found the contract-based approach to be contrary to the plain language of the CFAA, 
established public policy, copyright law, First Amendment law, state employment 
regulation, and trade secret law).  
 110. Katherine Messenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract:  Determining 
Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 
823 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the agency-based theory as a direct 
application of agency law to interpret authorization). 
 111. See, e.g., ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610–13 
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (discussing how several federal courts of appeals and numerous 
federal district courts have addressed allegations that an employee exceeds 
authorized access when he obtains information for a use that is adverse to the 
employer’s interests). 
 112. 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).   
 113. Id. at 1123. 
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without Shurgard’s knowledge or permission.114  The court, relying 
primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Agency, held that authorization 
ceases when accessers, here, the former Shurgard employees, sever 
the agency relationship by breaching a duty of loyalty to the 
employer/principal.115  Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
former employees acted without authorization in violation of § 
1030(a)(2)(C).116 
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
adopted the agency-based approach in International Airport Centers, 
L.L.C. v. Citrin.117  In Citrin, former employee Citrin allegedly violated 
his employment contract when he quit his job to establish a rival 
business.118  After deciding to resign, Citrin utilized a secure-erasure 
program on a work-issued laptop to delete all of the real-estate 
acquisition targeting data that he had collected for his former 
employer as well as evidence of Citrin’s misconduct.119  In adopting 
the agency-based approach, the court held that Citrin breached his 
duty of loyalty to his employer when he quit to establish a competing 
business, thereby severing the agency relationship and revoking his 
authorization to access the laptop.120 
The Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected the agency-based 
approach in LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka.121  In Brekka, a former 
LVRC employee, while still employed at LVRC, allegedly e-mailed 
documents from his work computer to himself and to his wife to 
establish a competing business.122  The court rejected LVRC’s agency-
based argument that authorization terminates the moment that an 
employee’s interests becomes adverse to his employer, and expressly 
rejected Citrin in holding that Brekka neither acted without 
authorization nor exceeded his authorized access.123  Instead, the 
                                                          
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1125; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) (stating that 
agency terminates if an agent, without knowledge of the principal, acquires an 
adverse interest or commits a serious breach of loyalty to the principal). 
 116. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d. at 1125.  Notably, the court also 
rejected defendant’s arguments that:  (1) information protected under the CFAA was 
limited to that which could affect the public; (2) § 1030(a)(5)(C), which proscribes 
anyone from “intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization,” 
and, as a result of such conduct, causes damage, applies only to “outsiders” and not 
to employees; and (3) appropriation of information is insufficient to constitute 
“damage.”  Id. at 1125–27. 
 117. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).   
 118. Id. at 419. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 420–21. 
 121. 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 122. Id. at 1129–30. 
 123. Id. at 1133–35.  The court also employed the rule of lenity to reject reading 
any state law duty of loyalty into the definition of “authorization,” noting that a 
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court held that “a person uses a computer ‘without authorization’ 
under §§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) when that person has not received 
permission to use the computer for any purpose [such as a hacker], 
or when the employer has rescinded permission . . . and the 
defendant uses the computer anyway.”124  Given this apparent circuit 
split on the viability of the agency-based approach,125 courts and 
academics have looked to other areas of the law in attempting to 
interpret the scope of “authorization.”126 
3. The code-based approach 
In expressing some concerns over the agency and contract 
theories, Professor Orin Kerr articulated a third approach to 
interpreting the scope of authorization:  the code-based approach.127  
Under this view of technical computer-based protections, access to a 
protected computer is unauthorized when a person circumvents 
some form of computer code built into the network or system, such 
as a username/password or a firewall.128 
Early intimations of this approach can be seen in the infamous 
university-hacking case, United States v. Morris.129  In Morris, a Cornell 
graduate student wrote and transmitted malicious code130 that spread 
                                                          
“defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of [a] company 
computer in breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a 
criminal violation of the CFAA.”  Id. at 1135.  
 124. Id.  The court also explained that “nothing in the CFAA suggests that a 
defendant’s authorization to obtain information stored in a company computer is 
‘exceeded’ if the defendant breaches a state law duty of loyalty to an employer, and 
we decline to read such a meaning into the statute.”  Id. at 1135 n.7. 
 125. See ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610–13 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2010) (analyzing the case law stemming from Citrin and Brekka and ultimately 
rejecting the agency-based approach as incompatible with the CFAA’s plain language 
in light of the rule of lenity).  Compare Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (adopting the agency-
based approach where authorization ends when an agent “‘voids the agency 
relationship’” by “‘[v]iolating the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse 
interests’” to those of the principal (quoting State v. DiGiulio, 835 P.2d 488, 492 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992))), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134 (refusing to adopt the agency 
theory and sever authorization when the defendant’s “mental state changed from 
loyal employee to disloyal competitor”).  
 126. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 
2683058, at *6–7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (explicitly rejecting the agency-based 
approach in favor of a “plain meaning” interpretation of authorized access); Field, 
supra note 110, at 821 nn.6–7 (listing various district court cases employing contract 
or code-based interpretations rather than the agency theory). 
 127. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649. 
 128. Id. at 1644–45 (discussing code-based circumventions as involving a user 
either:  (1) “masquerad[ing] as another user who has greater [access] privileges”; or 
(2) “exploit[ing] a weakness in the code within a program to cause the program to 
malfunction in a way that grants the user greater privileges”). 
 129. 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 130. While Morris wrote the malicious code on a computer at the Cornell lab to 
which he had been given authorization, he ultimately transmitted it from a computer 
HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] A VAGUE LAW IN A SMARTPHONE WORLD 1561 
uncontrollably to ultimately infect and crash university, medical 
research, and military servers around the country.131  The court 
rejected Morris’ argument that liability for accessing a computer 
“without authorization” was limited to the computer that Morris 
actually used to inject the malicious code.132  Rather, the court looked 
to the “intended function” of the university computer in holding that 
Morris’ program allowed him to “access” (through the malicious 
code) federal interest computers to which he did not have 
authorization to use.133  Professor Kerr expanded upon this idea of 
the “intended function” test in developing his code-based approach, 
explaining that “a user who exploits a weakness in code to trick the 
victim computer into granting the user extra privileges does so by 
using the code in a way contrary to its intended function.”134 
To date, no court has explicitly adopted the code-based approach, 
but the view is often conflated with a similar theory, described as the 
plain-meaning theory, because the scope of authorization often rests 
on a computer-based safeguard, such as a password.135  Nonetheless, 
this approach remains one of the leading academic approaches to 
addressing the statutorily-undefined and ambiguous provisions of the 
CFAA.136 
C. The Vagueness Doctrine and the CFAA 
The vagueness doctrine embodies the idea that due process 
requires Congress to enact statutes such that:  (1) the public can 
understand what conduct is prohibited; and (2) the courts have 
meaningful standards to enforce.137  In effect, the doctrine places a 
                                                          
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to disguise the code’s origin.  
Id. at 506.   
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 510. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1645. 
 135. See Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934–35 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2008) (asserting that “the plain meaning of ‘exceeds authorized access’ is ‘to 
go beyond the access permitted’” and the “plain meaning [of without authorization] 
is ‘no access authorization’”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. L-3 Comm. Corp., No. 6:05-
cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 569994, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2007) (declining to 
adopt an expanded view of authorized access beyond the plain language); Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *6 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 1, 2006) (noting that “the plain meaning [of exceeds authorized access] brings 
clarity to the picture and illuminates the straightforward intention of Congress”). 
 136. Chung, supra note 85, at 244 n.83 (citing Bellia, supra note 77, at 2258; Sara 
M. Smyth, Back to the Future:  Crime and Punishment in Second Life, 36 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 18, 41 (2009)).  But see Winn, supra note 76, at 1419 
(criticizing the code-based approach as “flatly inconsistent” with the CFAA’s 
separation of “unauthorized access” and “access in excess of authorization”). 
 137. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1966) (reversing a 
HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:08 PM 
1562 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1543 
due-process backstop138 behind Congress to allow courts to reign in 
broad and ambiguous statutes by substituting narrower readings of 
vague provisions.139   
The doctrine was introduced by Justice Sutherland in Connally v. 
General Construction Co.140  In Connally, the Court invalidated an 
Oklahoma statute criminalizing the failure of state contractors to pay 
employees fair wages in line with those paid in the locality.141  In 
doing so, the Court ordered that the terms of a criminal statute must 
explicitly state the prohibited conduct and its penalties in clear, 
unambiguous language, or risk violating due process of law.142 
Further, the doctrine has been interpreted to provide grounds for 
invalidating a statute not only when the statute does not provide “fair 
notice” to the public, but also when it inures law enforcement to 
engage in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.143  
While the vagueness doctrine is often considered a “powerful tool”144 
in First Amendment freedom-of-speech litigation,145 vague laws 
unrelated to speech regulation violate due process when a reasonable 
person cannot tell what conduct is prohibited.146  Notably, the due 
process rights implicated through application of the vagueness 
doctrine are not limited to individuals, as due process also extends to 
corporate entities.147   
                                                          
conviction for misdemeanor gun charges on due process vagueness grounds because 
the Pennsylvania statute lacked legally-fixed standards for both juries and judges). 
 138. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (explaining the 
constitutional roots of the vagueness doctrine). 
 139. Compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57, 64 (1999) (invalidating a 
Chicago anti-loitering ordinance for failing to provide fair notice, thus rendering the 
statute unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause), with id. at 
112 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ordinance should be upheld under a 
narrow reading of the ambiguous statutory language). 
 140. 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
 141. Id. at 395. 
 142. Id. at 391. 
 143. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (explaining that a 
statute is found to violate due process if it is so vague it enables “seriously 
discriminatory enforcement”); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (“Where the legislature fails 
to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless 
sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections.’” (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))). 
 144. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 943 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
 145. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (describing how precise 
drafting is required for First Amendment cases because the vagueness doctrine 
demands a “greater degree of specificity” when concerning expression). 
 146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 941–43; see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 
U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes 
which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the 
facts of the case at hand.”).   
 147. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (holding that a state 
law deprived a newspaper corporation of the liberty guaranteed under the 
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In the context of the CFAA, application of the vagueness doctrine 
revolves largely around the nebulous concepts of “authorization” and 
“access.”  There are certainly clear examples of unauthorized access 
to a protected computer that do not raise vagueness concerns.148  
Such instances include the injection of malicious code or the use of 
other hacking techniques to bypass a firewall, or infecting a website 
with malicious code to collect network passwords so the wrongdoer 
can sell them or otherwise disclose their contents.149  These types of 
cases appear to be clear-cut examples of hacking that should 
implicate liability for unauthorized access.  However, a significant 
gray area exists primarily in instances of “insider” access.150  Courts are 
therefore tasked with striking a balance that both prevents over-
punishment and deters unauthorized access, while staying within the 
boundaries of due process. 
II. BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS MAY RENDER 
THE CFAA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
The broadest and most troublesome provision of the CFAA is § 
1030(a)(2)(C), which creates criminal liability for whoever 
“intentionally . . . exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . 
information from any protected computer.”151  Many users easily 
satisfy the “obtains information” prong by simply observing 
                                                          
Fourteenth Amendment); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928) 
(explaining that it is well settled that “a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning 
of the due process clause” and accordingly may not be deprived of property without 
due process of law). 
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming a conviction under § 1030(a)(2)(C) when a collection agency employee 
gave access to customer accounts to his drug dealer in exchange for 
methamphetamine). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368–69 (D. Conn. 2001) 
(denying motion to dismiss under a plain-meaning approach when the defendant 
hacked into a “financial transaction clearinghouse,” obtained network passwords, 
and then blackmailed the company). 
 150. “Insider” access is closely linked to the idea of “exceeds authorized access,” 
namely that one who has initial authorization and then later exceeds it is said to have 
done so from the “inside.”  By comparison, the idea of an “outsider” is associated 
with the idea of acting “without authorization” and embodies the typical conception 
of a hacker.  See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *3 
(9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (“‘[W]ithout authorization’ would apply to outside 
hackers (individuals who have no authorized access to the computer at all) and 
‘exceeds authorized access’ would apply to inside hackers (individuals whose initial 
access to a computer is authorized but who access unauthorized information or 
files).”); S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 6 (1996) (“The amendment specifically covers the 
conduct of an [outsider] who deliberately breaks into a computer without authority, 
or an insider who exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains classified 
information and then communicates the information to another person, or retains it 
without delivering it to the proper authorities.”).  
 151. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006).   
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information, including routine actions such as checking e-mail or 
visiting a website.152  In addition, almost anything with a microchip 
qualifies as a “protected computer.”153  Accordingly, criminal liability 
turns on the first prong:  what does it mean to exceed authorized 
access?154  The answer to this question is critical, yet the statute does 
not provide any meaningful guidance.155  Broad interpretations, 
including those that would find liability for violations of written 
access agreements156 or breaches of agency law duties,157 raise 
significant problems of overbreadth and vagueness necessitating a 
more narrowly-tailored approach. 
While the current approaches to interpreting unauthorized access 
under the CFAA may offer viable options for some factual scenarios, 
mobile app data privacy cases present new concerns not adequately 
addressed by these theories.  The contract-based approach, most 
frequently applied in employment contract cases, does not translate 
to the world of mobile apps where there typically are no privacy-
policy agreements between an app developer and an app user.158  
Even if an app includes a privacy policy, the app developer writes the 
terms and therefore can dictate the ambit of authorization.159  This 
                                                          
 152. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (describing the broad scope of 
the statute); see also United States v. Tolliver, No. 08-26, 2009 WL 2342639, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2484 (1986)) (stating that “obtaining 
information” under the statute requires merely observing, not actually removing, the 
information), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 97 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 153. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the scope of “protected computer” as 
concurrent with the breadth of commerce clause jurisdiction). 
 154. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (defining “authorized access” and laying out the 
criminal elements of computer fraud); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 
1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting § 1030 and what constitutes “authorized access”), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011). 
 155. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (providing an arguably-circular definition of 
“exceeds authorized access”—“to access a computer with authorization and to use 
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not 
entitled to so obtain or alter”—but failing to define the scope of entitlement). 
 156. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (employing the contract-based approach 
to criminally punish a SSA employee for violating the administration’s computer 
terms of use agreement); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(ultimately rejecting the contract-based approach when applied to website terms of 
service agreements). 
 157. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 
2009) (criticizing and rejecting the agency-based approach); Int’l Airport Ctrs., 
L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (adopting the agency-based 
approach).  
 158. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 10 (finding that forty-five out of the 101 most 
popular apps do not have privacy policies); Mark Hachman, Most Mobile Apps Lack 
Privacy Policies:  Study, PCMAG.COM (Apr. 27, 2011, 7:30 AM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2384363,00.asp (describing a recent study 
concluding that only nineteen percent of the top 340 free apps utilize privacy 
policies). 
 159. See United States v. Nosal, No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc) (detailing how a broad, contract-based interpretation of 
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discretion essentially allows the developer to manipulate the policy 
“so as to turn [the user-developer relationship] into one policed by 
the criminal law.”160  Problems of fair notice and arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement consequently arise when criminal 
liability “turn[s] on the vagaries of private policies that are lengthy, 
opaque, subject to change and seldom read.”161  Similarly, application 
of the agency-based approach presents fair notice problems.  As the 
agency-based approach interprets unauthorized access as a breach of 
a duty of loyalty, app developers would engage in unauthorized access 
any time a user felt that the app infringed on his subjective 
interests.162  Accordingly, under either the contract- or agency-based 
theory, app developers do not have fair notice of what conduct is 
either without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and the 
CFAA therefore runs afoul of the vagueness doctrine. 
A. The Contract-Based Approach Raises Fair Notice Concerns for Mobile 
Apps 
To apply the contract-based approach to mobile apps, the first task 
is to identify which documents or agreements constitute contracts.163  
The most obvious examples are app privacy policies.  Applying the 
contract-based theory, an app developer who violates the terms of a 
privacy policy and obtains information from a user’s phone would 
have accessed information in excess of his authorization.164  
                                                          
“exceeds authorized access” would criminalize innocuous Internet browsing if such 
activities technically violated an employer’s terms of use agreement); see also Letter 
from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Legislative Office et al., to U.S. 
Sens. Leahy & Grassley (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CFAA_ 
Sign-on_ltr.pdf (describing, as a “gross misuse of the law,” the adherence to a strict 
contract-based interpretation to allow private corporations to establish what conduct 
violates federal criminal law).   
 160. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 465 (articulating that vagueness problems will result if 
a website owner can set the scope of criminal conduct through a terms of service 
agreement). 
 161. See Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4 (explaining that while many computer-use 
policies limit employee use to only “business purposes,” such a restriction is 
inherently vague and also virtually meaningless in light of the fact that employers 
rarely discipline the occasional use of work computers for personal purposes). 
 162. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 
2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding a former employee liable for access 
“without authorization” under § 1030(a)(2)(C) when he acquired interests adverse 
to those of his employer).   
 163. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (describing various types of 
documents that can be considered contracts, including both formal and informal 
agreements). 
 164. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that violating the Social Security Administration computer-use policy, considered by 
the court to be a contract, constituted “exceeding authorized access”); United States 
v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that corporate policies can define 
“the purposes for which access is ‘authorized’” such that a violation of the corporate 
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Accordingly, the app developer would have violated § 
1030(a)(2)(C)’s prohibition on merely obtaining information from a 
protected computer in excess of authorization.165  The problem with 
this approach, however, is that app developers, not end-users, write 
the privacy policies.  Therefore, the policy is open to manipulation 
that would protect developers while still leaving end-users vulnerable 
to broad privacy policies with no consequences for infringing 
developers. 
It may be easiest to see the problem by looking at the typical cases 
in which courts employ the contract-based approach:  employment 
disputes.  In the typical employment case, an employee violates the 
terms of an employment contract by accessing files on his employer’s 
network to which the employee either:  (1) has not been given 
express permission, known as access without authorization;166 or (2) 
uses information to which he had initial access in a manner 
inconsistent with the scope of his employment, known as exceeding 
authorized access.167  Analogizing to the world of mobile applications, 
it is the end-user that should be viewed as the “employer” and the app 
developer as the “employee,” since it is the app developer who is 
acting without or in excess of his authorized access.168  Given this 
strange juxtaposition, an app developer has the power to dictate the 
terms by which he may access the user’s data.169  Accordingly, 
                                                          
policy is an impermissible access in excess of authorization); United States v. 
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that violation of employment 
contract limiting computer use to “official purposes” constituted “exceeding 
authorized access”). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 166. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(differentiating “without authorization” as “access[ing] a computer [or portion 
thereof] without any permission at all,” from “exceeds authorized access” as a person 
who “has permission to access the computer, but accesses information on the 
computer that the person is not entitled to access”); see also United States v. Phillips, 
477 F.3d 215, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding, on “without authorization” 
grounds, the conviction of a student who used his privileges on a university computer 
to access part of the system to which he did not have a password).  
 167. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581–82 (1st Cir. 
2001) (concluding that a former employee exceeded authorized access by violating a 
broad confidentiality agreement when he created a high-speed “scraper” program to 
mine a former employer’s public website for pricing information). 
 168. See Complaint ¶ 45, Hines v. OpenFeint, Inc., No. CV-11-3084 (N.D. Cal. June 
22, 2011), 2011 WL 2471471 (alleging breach of contract when mobile-gaming 
network company accessed, without authorization, users’ personal information for 
marketing analytics and targeted advertising profiles); Complaint at 3–4, 68–70, Lalo 
v. Apple, Inc., No. 10-cv-05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 5393496 (alleging 
that app developers and mobile advertisers acted without authorization or exceeded 
authorized access when their apps acquired personal information such as gender, 
age, race, geographic location, and household income without express permission 
from the user). 
 169. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 465 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]erms of 
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developers have little incentive to even include a privacy policy, let 
alone draft one to include anything less than the broadest possible 
authority to access a user’s information.170  Essentially, this approach 
puts app developers in a position to manipulate privacy policies by 
simultaneously altering the user-developer relationship into one 
governed by criminal law while drafting broad enough policies to 
insulate the developer from any liability.171  This, in turn, implicates 
the vagueness doctrine by failing to provide adequate notice of what 
specific conduct constitutes a violation of law while concurrently 
inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  
The recent case Drew illustrates this point.172  While the court in 
Drew refused to find a violation of a website TOS agreement 
tantamount to a § 1030(a)(2)(C) violation, the court did not 
pronounce that TOS agreements may never govern authorization.173  
Rather, the court reasoned that creating a situation where some TOS 
agreements (or merely some provisions), but not others, dictate the 
scope of authorized access creates an inherently unclear situation 
where users do not have fair notice as to what conduct implicates 
criminal liability.174  This approach also fails the second prong of the 
vagueness doctrine because the statue would lack minimum 
guidelines to preclude arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.175  
                                                          
service may allow the website owner to unilaterally amend and/or add to the terms 
with minimal notice to users.”). 
 170. See id. (“[W]ebsite owners can establish terms where either the scope or the 
application of the provision are to be decided by them ad hoc and/or pursuant to 
undelineated standards.”). 
 171. Those in favor of a contract-based approach to determine the scope of 
authorized access have also turned to the tort of trespass for support.  See Brief for 
Oracle Am. Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants, United States v. 
Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-10038), available at 
http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Oracle-America-Amicus.pdf 
(citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts to argue that the tort of trespass can govern 
written restrictions on access because any conclusions are derived from factually-
driven, common-sense, totality of the circumstances analyses).  This trespass-oriented 
approach, however, fails to support the use of written access restrictions in the CFAA 
context because the CFAA is a criminal statute subject to vagueness concerns whereas 
the standard for the common law trespass tort is inherently unclear.  See Orin Kerr, 
The Trespass Tort Versus the CFAA:  A Response to the Oracle Amicus Brief in Nosal, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/12/05/the-
trespass-tort-versus-the-cfaa-a-response-to-the-oracle-amicus-brief-in-nosal/ (discussing 
the conceptual differences between physical trespass and computer-based trespass to 
discount the trespass-tort approach as unpersuasive and improperly applied to the 
CFAA).   
 172. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009); supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Drew decision). 
 173. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466. 
 174. See id. at 464 (explaining that a contract-based interpretation of the CFAA 
fails to provide fair notice because “it is unclear whether any or all violations of terms 
of service will render the access unauthorized, or whether only certain ones will”). 
 175. See id. at 467 (concluding that a contract-based approach would result in § 
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Permitting website owners to dictate the line for criminality in the 
form of easily-amendable TOS agreements, which few people actually 
read,176 creates a similarly non-definite situation encouraging arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement in contravention of the vagueness 
doctrine.177 
The website TOS approach is directly analogous to mobile app 
privacy policies.  By placing the power in the hands of app developers 
not only to dictate initial access rights, but to freely amend the terms 
to comport with the developer’s whims with minimal, if any, notice to 
users, the CFAA’s prohibitions on access without authorization would 
not have sufficient clarity to provide fair notice as to what conduct 
actually violates the statute. 
B. The Agency-Based Approach Raises Arbitrary Enforcement Concerns for 
Mobile Apps 
The agency-based approach focuses on the idea that an agent 
violates the CFAA’s unauthorized access prohibitions by breaching a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal.178  Further, the agent is said 
to breach that duty of loyalty by engaging in conduct inconsistent 
with the interests of the principal.179  On its face, it is difficult to 
extrapolate the agency-based approach to mobile apps, since there is 
no obvious principal-agent relationship between an app developer 
and an end-user akin to a typical employer-employee relationship.180  
                                                          
1030(a)(2)(C) “becom[ing] a law ‘that affords too much discretion to the police and 
too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet]’” (quoting City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999))). 
 176. See, e.g., Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I.S.J.L.P. 543, 555, 565 (2009) (calculating that the average website 
privacy policy takes approximately ten minutes to read and estimating that to read 
every privacy policy for each website visited would require approximately 201 hours 
per person per year and cost each person about $3534 in lost annual productivity); 
Privacy Policy Infographic, SELECTOUT.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://selectout.org/blog/ 
privacy-policy-infographic/ (analyzing the 1000 most-visited websites and calculating 
that the average privacy policy is 2462 words long with the longest policy over 11,000 
words long). 
 177. See Kerr, supra note 40, at 1582 & n.163 (describing the infrequency with 
which users read terms-of-service contracts, and discussing the absurd results that can 
follow from allowing these agreements to govern access rights). 
 178. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(invoking § 387 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to conclude that a former 
employee violated his duty of loyalty when “he resolved to destroy files . . . that were . 
. . the property of his employer”). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958); see also WILLIAM A. GREGORY, 
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 103 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that beginning 
work for a competitor is tantamount to obtaining an adverse interest). 
 180. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 
2683058, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (“[B]y reading Restatement [(Second) of Agency] 
§ 112 legalese into the meaning of ‘without authorization,’ the term becomes 
equipped with a breadth that effectively shaves ‘exceeds authorized access’ down to a 
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The app developer, however, is the party “obtaining” information 
purportedly in violation of the interests of the app user,181 and, as 
such, the app developer is in the same position as the 
employee/agent for purposes of the principal-agent connection.  The 
key problem with trying to employ the agency-based approach to 
mobile app cases, however, is that there may be millions of users of a 
single app, each with invariably different “interests.”182  Accordingly, 
an app’s information-collection plan may comport with the interests 
of some users but directly conflict with those of others.183  The agency-
based approach would then permit criminal prosecution and civil 
liability when the app collects information adverse to the subjective 
interests of a single user.184  Such an approach falls short of providing 
developers with fair notice of what information their apps may obtain 
to avoid exceeding authorized access and implicating liability.185 
The recent case Nosal illustrates the difficulty of applying the 
                                                          
mere sliver of what its plain meaning suggests.”); see also Field, supra note 110, at 843–
44 (discussing the difficulties of applying the “elusive and nebulous” principles of 
common-law fiduciary duties to a statutory setting, and noting agency law’s “potential 
for manipulability” to obtain outcomes commonly “cloaked in moralistic terms”). 
 181. See Complaint ¶ 47, Hines v. OpenFeint, Inc., No. CV-11-3084 (N.D. Cal. June 
22, 2011), 2011 WL 2471471 (alleging that the use of personal information collected 
through a mobile-gaming app for purposes of marketing and targeted advertising 
violated user’s privacy interests); Complaint at 68–70, Lalo v. Apple, Inc., No. 10-cv-
05878 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 5393496 (alleging that the collection of 
purportedly personal information through mobile apps violated users’ privacy 
interests). 
 182. See Privacy Please!  U.S. Smartphone App Users Concerned with Privacy When it 
Comes to Location, NIELSEN.COM (Apr. 21, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/ 
nielsenwire/online_mobile/privacy-please-u-s-smartphone-app-users-concerned-with-
privacy-when-it-comes-to-location (finding that mobile app users’ concerns over 
privacy vary based on both gender and age demographics).  Nielsen’s research 
shows, for example, that only a slight majority of men (fifty-two percent) and women 
(fifty-nine percent) are concerned about privacy relating to location-based apps.  Id.  
 183. Id.; see Lockheed Martin, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7 (rejecting the agency-based 
approach in part because “the ‘adverse interest’ inquiry affixes remarkable reach to 
the [CFAA]” such that an employee checking e-mail on company time could 
implicate criminal liability). 
 184. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(upholding an employee’s liability under the CFAA when he breached a duty of 
loyalty to his employer, thereby severing the agency relationship, and therefore 
acting without authorization); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 
Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (applying the Restatement to hold 
that authorization ceases when an agent acts with an interest adverse to that of the 
principal).  
 185. Despite the potential fair-notice problems and the inconsistencies of 
importing agency law principles into the CFAA, some courts continue to rely on the 
Citrin approach if there is a “pattern of activity adverse to [an] employer’s interests.”  
See Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. v. Carlson, No. 11 C 327, 2011 WL 2923865, at *4–5 
(N.D. Ill. July 18, 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss a CFAA claim against a former 
employee who destroyed data on a company-issued laptop, and holding that a breach 
of a duty of an employee’s duty of loyalty can support a “without authorization” claim 
under § 1030(a)(2)). 
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agency-based approach without implicating vagueness concerns.186  In 
Nosal, the majority en banc ultimately concluded that an employee 
does not exceed authorized access when that access violates an 
employer’s computer-use restrictions.187  Accordingly, the employee 
was not liable under the CFAA despite acting contrary to his 
employer’s interest and breaching a state-law duty of loyalty.188  In 
reversing the panel decision, which reached a contrary conclusion in 
large part because Nosal was charged with violating § 1030(a)(4) and 
not the broader § 1030(a)(2)(C),189 the court reasoned that 
principles of statutory construction foreclosed interpretation of 
“exceeds authorized access” in different ways for each subsection 
when Congress provided only one statutory definition.190  
The en banc court corrected the panel’s failure to recognize that 
the panel’s interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” under § 
1030(a)(4) would drastically change the scope of the already broader 
§ 1030(a)(2)(C), which has no intent-to-defraud requirement.191  By 
contrast, the en banc court reasoned that by utilizing an employer’s 
computer-use restrictions to define the boundaries of “exceeding 
authorized access” under § 1030(a)(4), anyone who obtains 
information from a computer connected to the Internet, in 
contravention of those restrictions, violates § 1030(a)(2)(C).192  Such 
an interpretation creates a situation not only where criminal liability 
rests on employer restrictions that are “not necessarily drafted with 
the definiteness or precision that would be required for a criminal 
statute,”193 but would also make the CFAA ripe for arbitrary and 
                                                          
 186. See supra notes 101–09 and accompanying text (discussing the Nosal 
decision). 
 187. No. 10-10038, 2012 WL 1176119, at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (en banc).   
 188. See id. at *9 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (articulating how the court’s decision 
in Brekka foreclosed “exceed[ing] authorized access” liability for duty of loyalty 
breaches).  
 189. Section 1030(a)(4) requires both intent to defraud and violative access that 
furthers the intended fraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006).  In contrast. § 
1030(a)(2)(C) has no such mens rea requirement.  Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
 190. Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *4. 
 191. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (covering “[w]hoever knowingly and with 
intent to defraud [accesses] a protected computer without authorization” (emphasis 
added)), with id. § 1030(a)(2) (covering “[w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access” (emphasis added)). 
 192. Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *5; see also United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 
790 (9th Cir. 2011) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (arguing, on similar vagueness 
grounds, against the broader interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in order 
to avoid criminalizing innocuous computer use), rev’d en banc, No. 10-10038, 2012 
WL 1176119 (9th Cir. Apr. 10, 2012).  But see Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *10 
(Silverman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the en banc majority improperly “posit[ed] 
a laundry list of wacky hypotheticals” under § 1030(a)(2)(C) instead of focusing 
purely on § 1030(a)(4)). 
 193. Nosal, 642 F.3d at 790 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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discriminatory enforcement194 and render the statute 
unconstitutionally vague.195 
These vagueness concerns similarly arise in attempting to apply the 
agency theory to mobile app data privacy cases.  Reading a duty of 
loyalty into the relationship between app developers and users would 
mean that anytime an app obtained any information from a user’s 
phone, in violation of the interests of the user, the app developer 
would be guilty of a federal crime under § 1030(a)(2)(C).196  While 
the panel majority in Nosal tried to counter this line of argument by 
imposing a requirement that the employee/agent “ha[ve] 
knowledge” of the employer/principal’s limitations in order to 
implicate liability, this requirement has no support in either the text 
of the CFAA nor the legislative history, “and only becomes necessary 
upon adopting the [panel] majority’s interpretation of ‘exceeds 
authorization.’”197   
Application of the agency-based approach essentially means that 
each time an agent “obtains” information from a protected computer 
that does not further the principal’s interest, such as checking 
personal e-mail or a personal Facebook account, each instance can 
amount to a federal crime.198  In the context of mobile apps, each 
time an app accesses a piece of user information for purposes other 
than what the user considers to be within the scope of his interests, 
the app developer is obtaining information from a protected 
computer in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C).199  Accordingly, the agency-
                                                          
 194. Nosal, 2012 WL 1178119, at *6 (rejecting the government’s assurance that it 
would not prosecute minor violations and noting that “the difference between 
puffery [in the form of lying about age or height on a social media website] and 
prosecution may depend on whether you happen to be someone an AUSA has 
reason to go after”). 
 195. Id. at *6–7 (combining a discussion of the vagueness doctrine’s fair notice 
and arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement prongs with the court’s related rule of 
lenity concerns). 
 196. See Nosal, 642 F.3d at 788 (“[A]s long as the employee has knowledge of the 
employer’s limitation on that authorization, the employee ‘exceeds authorized 
access’ when the employee violates those limitations.”).   
 197. Id. at 790 n.3 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 198. See Kerr, supra note 40, at 1586–87 (“[A] broad agency theory of 
authorization would turn millions of employees into criminals [and] give the 
government the power to arrest almost anyone who had a computer at work . . . .”); 
see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 
2683058, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (cautioning against the agency-based 
approach and suggesting that merely checking personal e-mail at work could amount 
to CFAA liability). 
 199. See Nosal, 2012 WL 1176119, at *5 (noting that merely visiting ESPN.com or 
playing sudoku from a work computer would be transformed into a federal crime); 
Nosal, 642 F.3d at 790 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (explaining that merely “viewing” 
information for any purpose adverse to the interest of the computer owner would be 
grounds for a federal crime). 
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theory approach does not provide fair notice to app developers as to 
what kinds of specific information an app may obtain without 
implicating liability under the CFAA.  Absent such fair notice, the 
CFAA fails to comport with due process under the vagueness 
doctrine.200 
C. The Code-Based Approach is Under-Inclusive Because it Ignores the 
Problem of Insider Misuse of Information 
At first blush, the code-based approach seems like a simple and 
attractive way to define the limits of authorized access to computers.201  
However, the theory does not adequately address the issue of insider 
misuse of information by failing to protect unsophisticated users, 
limiting liability to only those acting without authorization, and 
failing to provide a remedy for unauthorized access to data stored by 
third parties.   
Under this view, a person acts without authorization by 
circumventing computer-code-based restrictions.202  Similarly, the 
person acts in excess of authorization if she has initial permission to 
access a computer but then bypasses a code-based restriction to access 
other information on a different part of the computer or network.203  
The code-based approach therefore places the burden of 
safeguarding information on the computer owner, instead of 
burdening the accesser to rigidly comply with either the express 
terms of a contract or the vague notion of the owner’s interests.204  By 
punishing the exploitation of vulnerabilities through malicious code 
                                                          
 200. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57, 64 (1999) (expounding the 
notion that criminal statutes must provide fair notice in order to comport with due 
process and avoid constitutional vagueness). 
 201. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649 (arguing that the code-based approach strikes 
a balance between the often-conflicting goals of Internet regulation:  Internet-
freedom and data-protection). 
 202. See Garrett D. Urban, Comment, Causing Damage Without Authorization:  The 
Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1379–80 (2011) (describing access 
in excess of authorization as requiring a person with initial access to “fake 
identification, ‘exploit a weakness in the code,’ or affirmatively act to misuse the 
computer in some way”). 
 203. Id.; see also Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 810 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638, 643 (S.D.N.Y 
2011) (denying a motion to dismiss a complaint against mega-ISP Time Warner for 
“throttling” peer-to-peer file-sharing speeds, and employing a “plain meaning,” 
dictionary-definition approach to determine the scope of access). 
 204. See Urban, supra note 202, at 1380 n.66 (citing State v. Riley, 988 A.2d 1252, 
1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009)) (acknowledging that courts have not yet 
adopted a code-based interpretation for the CFAA, but identifying one such judicial 
interpretation in reference to a state computer fraud statute); see also Sw. Airlines Co. 
v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06 Civ. 0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 
12, 2007) (utilizing a dictionary-definition approach to define access as “to get at” or 
“gain access to” similar to the code-based approach). 
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or “tricking” the computer by using someone else’s username and 
password, the code-based theory comes closest to addressing the 
original intent of the CFAA as an anti-hacking provision,205 and 
therefore provides a strong remedy for outsider access that is 
inherently “without authorization.”  
However, this focus on bypassing security as the sole means of 
defining unauthorized access in effect blurs the line between access 
“without authorization” and access that “exceeds authorization,” a 
distinction that both the plain text of the CFAA206 and legislative 
history strongly support.207  Absent this distinction, the CFAA would 
offer no protection to unsophisticated users, such as a homeowner 
who fails to secure a wireless network or a careless business owner.208  
More importantly, this approach would fail to implicate liability for 
an insider who is given authorization to access a computer, but then 
later misuses information on the computer.209  There would be no 
cause of action even if the insider causes significant damage either to 
the computer itself—deleting files, inserting malicious code, etc.—or 
to its owner, perhaps through disclosure or sale of sensitive 
information to a third party.210  Applying the code-based approach to 
                                                          
 205. Compare Kerr, supra note 23, at 1644–45 (discussing circumvention of 
regulation by code through masquerade or malicious manipulation of computer 
weaknesses), with S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2479, 2485 (discussing the need to balance concern for authorized users “against the 
legitimate need to protect Government computers against abuse by ‘outsiders’”).  
 206. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2), (4)–(5) (2006) (specifically prohibiting either 
access without authorization or actions that exceed authorized access).  Collapsing 
these two phrases into one does not comport with the Supreme Court’s recurrent 
position that statutory interpretations should avoid rendering terms superfluous.  
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 442 (2009); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106 
(1993) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990)); Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
 207. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 4 (1996) (discussing the dichotomy between the 
CFAA’s privacy protection coverage for outsider perpetrators who obtain 
nonclassified information via unauthorized computer access on one hand and 
“[g]overnment employees who abuse their computer access to obtain Government 
information that may be sensitive and confidential”); see also Chung, supra note 85, at 
246 (citing United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 460 (C.D. Cal. 2009)) (discussing 
the distinction between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorization” 
language). 
 208. Winn, supra note 76, at 1421. 
 209. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 
1272–73 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (recognizing that access in the CFAA context cannot be 
defined without considering the “freedom or ability to . . . make use of something” 
(emphasis added) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The court there further explained that 
“[f]or purposes of the CFAA, when someone sends an e-mail message from his or her 
own computer, and the message then is transmitted through a number of computers 
until it reaches its destination, the sender is making use of all of those computers, 
and is therefore ‘accessing’ them.”  Id. at 1273. 
 210. See Winn, supra note 76, at 1420 (analogizing to the tort of trespass to chattels 
to argue that the code-based approach “leaves data subjects with no legal remedy 
HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:08 PM 
1574 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1543 
mobile app cases, an app developer would only be subject to liability 
under the CFAA if the developer circumvents some kind of safeguard 
built into the phone, such as a username/password or other security 
measure, but not if the developer seriously misuses any information 
obtained through the app or damages the user’s phone. 
Critics of the code-based approach have raised similar concerns 
over its rigid and under-inclusive nature, noting “code-based theory 
limits data owners’ flexibility in the ways they might choose to protect 
their data.”211  Moreover, the code-based approach does not appear to 
provide an avenue for relief for users’ data stored by a third party, 
such as in the instance of cloud computing.212  In short, the code-
based approach’s attempt to simplify unauthorized access fails to 
offer a remedy for harm resulting from access in excess of 
authorization despite the CFAA’s explicit distinction between insider 
and outsider access. 
III.  COURTS SHOULD LIMIT INTERPRETATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED 
ACCESS TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF HACKING OR SERIOUS MISUSE OF 
INFORMATION 
As the broader agency- and contract-based views raise significant 
vagueness concerns, commentators have stressed the importance of a 
narrow view in order to not only avoid constitutional issues,213 but also 
to shift the focus of the statute towards its original intent as an anti-
hacking provision.214  The code-based approach, which limits 
unauthorized access to the circumvention of any computer-code 
restrictions, appears superficially to provide a straightforward method 
for interpreting unauthorized access.215  However, this view blurs the 
                                                          
against unauthorized intruders into their private data”). 
 211. Chung, supra note 85, at 247; see also Winn, supra note 76, at 1419 (arguing 
that the code-based approach “artificially restricts the set of norms to which courts 
are permitted to look, to . . . a system of ‘norms by nerds’”). 
 212. See Chung, supra note 85, at 247 (criticizing Kerr’s argument about incentives 
due to situations involving third-party possession of data including cloud 
computing). 
 213. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1658–59 (advocating a code-based approach to 
avoid the overbreadth and vagueness concerns associated with a contract-based 
approach to interpreting unauthorized access).  
 214. See Urban, supra note 202, at 1406–10 (proposing a fraud-based amendment 
to the CFAA in order to realign the statute with the original focus on hackers and 
outsiders); see also Darden, supra note 34, at 356, 359 (arguing that absent a 
simplified approach to interpreting unauthorized access under the CFAA, Congress 
needs to adopt an entirely new statute to cover post-access conduct such as 
cyberbullying and online harassment).  
 215. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1649 (“Access should be deemed ‘without 
authorization’ only when it either violates the Morris intended function test, or else 
uses false identification to trick the computer into granting the user greater 
privileges.”). 
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line between access without authorization and access in excess of 
authorization, and it also fails to provide a remedy for cases of insider 
misuse of information.216  By limiting the scope of unauthorized 
access to traditional notions of hacking for outsider cases and misuse 
of information for insider cases, courts can promote the CFAA’s 
original intent as an anti-hacking statute and address insider cases 
without implicating the vagueness doctrine.217 
A. Legislative History Does not Unambiguously Support the Agency-, 
Contract-, or Code-Based Approaches  
As courts struggle to interpret the scope of authorized access under 
the CFAA, judges often rely on legislative history for insight into 
legislative purpose or intent.218  Courts and commentators tend to 
agree that instances of traditional hacking by “outsiders” present 
relatively uncomplicated questions of unauthorized access liability, so 
the focus of legislative history analysis often revolves around 
discussion of insider liability.219  This approach also makes sense for 
evaluating mobile app data privacy cases, as apps gain access to user 
data through user-download of the app and not some kind of forced 
entry into the phone through malicious code.220  Courts, however, 
                                                          
 216. See Winn, supra note 76, at 1419 (arguing that the code-based approach is 
“flatly inconsistent” with both the plain language of the statute and the 1996 
legislative history). 
 217. The Supreme Court recently addressed the vagueness doctrine, albeit in the 
context of the “honest-services” doctrine of mail- and wire-fraud statutes, by 
articulating that concerns about constitutional vagueness necessitate a narrower 
statutory construction.  See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (finding 
the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to bribery and kick-back schemes did not violate 
either prong of the vagueness doctrine:  (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and 
discrimination prosecutions).  In Skilling, the Court ultimately held that 18 U.S.C. § 
1346—prohibiting wire fraud that causes harm in the form of the denial of the 
“injured” party’s right to the offender’s “honest services” even though the betrayed 
party suffered no deprivation of money or property—did not violate the vagueness 
doctrine.  Id. at 2933.  Notably, the Court said that narrow and limited statutory 
constructions must be considered prior to striking a federal statute as 
unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 2929 (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 
(1895)).   
 218. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–61 (1992) (discussing five reasons for turning to legislative 
history to interpret a statute, including (1) avoiding an absurd result, (2) correcting 
drafting errors, (3) deciphering specialized terms, (4) discerning the “reasonable 
purpose” of a particular provision, and (5) deciding between competing “reasonable 
purposes”). 
 219. See Field, supra note 110, at 831 (explaining that “outsider” liability—
traditional hackers breaking into computers—is clearly articulated in legislative 
history, but the scope of “insider” access has been consistently unclear). 
 220. See Claire Cain Miller, For Hackers, The Next Lock to Pick:  Companies See 
Opportunity In Cellphone Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at B1 (discussing how app 
users can be tricked into downloading infected apps laden with malicious code, but 
also noting the possibility of remote hacks similar to traditional computer break-ins). 
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tend to use legislative history to merely support the approach that 
they have already decided to adopt.221 
Early congressional discussions of insider liability arguably lend 
some support to both agency- and contract-based interpretations.222  
Specifically, commentary surrounding the 1984 act suggests that 
Congress wanted to preclude liability for access in furtherance of a 
“legitimate business purpose . . . pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization,” yet failed to clarify what would constitute a legitimate 
business purpose.223  Further, congressional discussions of the 1986 
amendments focused on the “improper” nature of access, but still did 
not detail how insiders were to ascertain what was, in fact, proper.224  
On one hand, discussions of “legitimate purposes” arguably lend 
support for the agency-based view, which focuses on the amorphous 
interests of a principal to define limits of the agent’s authorization.225  
By attempting to limit liability to only harmful, illegitimate purposes, 
the legislative history supports the notion that Congress intended the 
scope of authorization to be defined according to employer policies 
or perhaps accepted norms of typical employee computer usage.226  
On the other hand, “legitimate business purposes” or the scope of 
proper access could be clearly defined in some form of contract.227   
                                                          
 221. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008) (relying 
on legislative history to support a plain-meaning approach nearly identical to a code-
based view); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 
2d 1121, 1127–29 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (utilizing legislative history to support the 
agency-based approach and to “demonstrate the broad meaning and intended scope 
of the terms ‘protected computer’ and ‘without authorization’”). 
 222. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 
3707 (explaining that insider liability will not arise in instances of “information 
incidentally obtained or . . . obtained legitimately,” and also “does not extend to any 
type or form of computer access that is for a legitimate business purpose”); see also 
Field, supra note 110, at 831 (explaining that congressional discussions suggested 
that its understanding of authorization centered around the “purpose of access,” 
which could fit with either the agency- or contract-based approach). 
 223. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3707 
(explaining only that the CFAA is designed to “impose[] criminal sanctions upon 
‘hackers’ and other criminals who access computers without authorization” but does 
not extend to any “normal and customary business procedures and information 
usage”). 
 224. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 7 (1986) (noting, without elaboration, that “[t]he 
improper modifications, destructions or disclosures by authorized users . . . are 
covered presently by [§ 1030(a)(3)]”). 
 225. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3701 
(articulating an exemption from criminal liability for “incidential [sic] use[s] of the 
computer . . . [such as] do[ing] homework or play[ing] computer games”). 
 226. See Field, supra note 110, at 831–32 (explaining that the “original 
understanding [of insider liability] was more on par with the agency-based or 
contract-based interpretations later used by courts than the code-based 
interpretations”). 
 227. See generally United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219–21 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that website owners can establish the extent to which the public may access 
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However, the 1986 amendments also replaced notions of “purpose” 
in the definition of “exceeds authorized access” with the current 
language precluding access to information to which the accesser is 
not “entitled.”228  This shift towards entitlement does little more than 
confuse the issue further, as there is no indication of whether 
entitlement is to be defined by some code-based limitations (i.e. 
username/password), contractual provisions, or a broader concept of 
employee loyalty.229  Accordingly, legislative history lends some 
support to each of the three interpretations and does not provide a 
clear roadmap for which interpretation Congress intended to govern 
the scope of authorized access.  
B. The Shortcomings of Current Theories of Interpreting Authorization 
Necessitate a Narrower View in Line with the Original Intent of the Statute as 
an Anti-Hacking Law  
While the broader agency- and contract-based approaches present 
vagueness concerns230 and the code-based approach is inherently 
under-inclusive,231 a narrower focus may be required to address 
mobile apps cases arising under the CFAA.  By limiting 
interpretations of without authorization to impose liability for 
traditional hacking, such as the use of malicious code or various 
social-engineering techniques,232 causes of action under the CFAA 
may harmonize with the primary intent of the statute as an anti-
                                                          
information on its website through some form of user agreement); EF Cultural 
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).  
 228. Compare Urban, supra note 202, at 1382 (describing the 1986 amendment to 
CFAA with a definition of authorization focusing on the user’s purpose), with 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006) (defining exceeding authorized access as access to 
information “that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter”). 
 229. Field, supra note 110, at 832. 
 230. See supra Parts II.A–B (describing the deficiencies of the contract- and agency-
based approaches). 
 231. See supra Part II.C (describing the infirmities of the code-based approach in 
blurring the distinction between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized 
access”). 
 232. One common social engineering technique is called “phishing,” which 
entails a “virtual trap set by cyber-thieves that uses official-looking e-mails to lure [the 
target] to fake websites and trick [the target] into revealing . . . personal 
information,” and the variant called “spear-phishing” typically involves the criminal 
having some inside information about the target in order to convince the target of 
the authenticity of the fake email or website.  Spear Phishers:  Angling to Steal Your 
Financial Info, FBI.GOV (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/ 
spearphishing_040109.  For a detailed overview of social engineering techniques, see 
Online Privacy, Social Networking, and Crime Victimization:  Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–12 
(July 28, 2010) (Remarks and Statement of Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir. Cyber 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).  
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hacking provision.233  In the context of mobile app cases, this view 
shifts the focus of the liability analysis away from invariably divergent 
interpretations of whether an app maker has an airtight privacy 
policy234 or acts in accordance with the nebulous interests of a 
multitude of users.235  Concurrently, by imposing liability on misuse of 
information for insider cases, the CFAA would also address instances 
of exceeding authorized access where data is obtained through non-
pernicious and authorized means but ultimately used for harmful 
purposes. 
The putative class action case In re iPhone Application Litigation236 
presents an instructive scenario.  Here, a class of Apple iPhone 
owners alleged that they incurred damages as a result of certain 
mobile applications accessing purportedly personal information, 
including geo-location data, address book, and keystroke history.237  
The allegations further asserted that app developers and advertisers 
gained access to this personal information both without and in excess 
of authorization in violation of § 1030(a)(2)(C) and then profited 
from the sale of users’ information for targeted advertising and 
marketing analytics purposes.238  Applying the code-based approach, 
the class does not appear to have sufficient grounds to support an 
unauthorized access claim, since there is no circumvention of any 
code-based security measures.239  Furthermore, the class appears to 
only allege vague damages or losses of more than $5000 aggregating 
over a one-year period, so the specific nature of the actual harm is 
                                                          
 233. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 3 (1996) (articulating that the CFAA was “originally 
enacted . . . to provide a clear statement of proscribed activity concerning . . . those 
tempted to commit crimes by unauthorized access to computers” (emphasis added)); 
id. at 7 (noting that “subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the 
interstate or foreign theft of information by computer” (emphasis added)); S. REP. 
NO. 101-544, at 4–5 (1990) (explaining that the CFAA’s private right of action was 
intended to redress serious computer abuse by outsiders); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482 (asserting that the CFAA was 
“aimed at deterring and punishing certain ‘high tech’ crimes”). 
 234. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of 
employing privacy policies as the foundation for CFAA liability). 
 235. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text (discussing the propensity for 
arbitrary enforcement when employing users’ interests as the basis for defining the 
scope of authorization). 
 236. No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 
2011). 
 237. Id. at *9. 
 238. Id. at *9–10.  
 239. The class alleged that mobile advertisers obtained information from the 
user’s phone after the user initiated and completed the download of an app.  Second 
Amended Complaint at 3–5, iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865 
(No. 11-MD-02250-LHK).  The complaint does not, however, make any mention of 
code-based restrictions in place to safeguard the purportedly personal information.  
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unclear and may only be the existence of more highly-targeted 
banner advertisements.240 
Judge Koh recognized these concerns and dismissed the 
complaint, with leave to amend, for three reasons:  (1) negligent 
software design is insufficient to support a CFAA claim; (2) users did 
not sufficiently allege that the defendants accessed their phones 
“without authorization” or that the defendants “exceed authorized 
access” by accessing their phones; and (3) app users have failed to 
identify specific economic damages.241  The rationale behind this 
second deficiency in the complaint is particularly instructive, namely 
that the voluntary nature of the user’s download of the app effectively 
precludes a “without authorization” claim.242  This reasoning supports 
the idea that the CFAA should be limited to traditional hacking cases 
in the context of mobile apps, as the court appears to imply that only 
forcible intrusions into users’ phones, like involuntarily downloaded 
apps, will support a “without authorization” claim.243  Concurrently, 
the court left open the possibility that a claim against an app 
developer could still exist for accessing data in excess of 
authorization, but such a claim would require a specific harm to the 
user caused by the developer’s access and not merely a generalized 
claim of privacy infringement.244 
Rather than continually expanding the CFAA to address specific 
                                                          
 240. Id. at 10. 
 241. iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–37.  Notably, 
Judge Koh used LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), for the 
definitions of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access,” reliance on 
which indicates that the court would reject the agency-based approach.  iPhone 
Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *39. 
 242. See iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–36 (citing In 
re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05152-JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98270, 
at *26 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2010)) (emphasizing that “voluntary installation runs 
counter to the notion that the alleged act was a trespass and to the CFAA’s 
requirement that the alleged act was ‘without authorization’ as well as the CPC’s 
requirement that the act was ‘without permission’” (emphasis added)).  Even in cases 
of voluntary download, there are numerous instances of apps accessing data on 
mobile devices beyond what was initially allowed in end user permissions.  See supra 
note 21 (collecting cases involving allegations that apps, although voluntarily 
downloaded, improperly accessed personal information on a user’s phone).  
 243. iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *35–36; see also La 
Court v. Specific Media, No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, 
at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (rejecting a similar data-privacy-based claim for 
failing to allege specific damages and unsuccessfully demonstrating that defendant 
intended damage to plaintiff’s computers by inserting tracking cookies). 
 244. See iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *36–37 (citing 
Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183 (DAB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93663, at *12–
14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011)) (explaining that collection of personal information for 
advertising purposes, even if conducted “without permission,” is insufficient to 
support a CFAA claim, but recognizing that identification of a “single act of harm” 
plus a showing of economic damage could suffice).  
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problems that happen to occur in the mobile space, utilizing other 
statutes may be a more effective means of combating certain types of 
abuses.  For cases involving privacy interests of children, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) affords specific 
remedies.245  Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is now 
seeking to explicitly include mobile privacy cases involving children 
under the age of thirteen within COPPA and the FTC’s COPPA 
Rule.246  Further, the FTC’s COPPA enforcement efforts leave little 
doubt that COPPA applies to mobile apps.247  For identity theft claims, 
the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 offers a 
more tailored means of prosecution and recovery.248  Cases involving 
privacy infringement associated with mobile messaging can be 
addressed through the Wiretap Act.249  Other claims related to 
improper access to voicemail or e-mail are covered under the Stored 
Communications Act.250  Phishing cases involving mobile apps that 
steal bank account or credit card numbers are covered under the 
federal statute that governs access device fraud.251  E-mail or other 
commercial advertisement spam claims that occur through mobile 
apps can be addressed through the CAN-SPAM Act.252  Each of these 
statutes is highly tailored to specific types of conduct, and application 
to the mobile space does not require the same kind of creative 
interpretive techniques as under the CFAA. 
From a normative perspective, criminal and civil liability under the 
CFAA makes sense for traditional hackers or fraudsters.253  However, 
                                                          
 245. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2006). 
 246. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,804 (proposed 
Sept. 27, 2011) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 247. See Consent Decree & Order at 2–4, United States v. W3 Innovations, LLC, 
No. CV-11-03958-PSG, FTC File No. 102 3251 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023251/110908w3order.pdf (settling charges under 
COPPA and the FTC’s COPPA rule that the defendant illegally collected—via a 
mobile app—and disclosed personal information from tens of thousands of children 
under the age of thirteen without their parents’ prior consent). 
 248. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006).  For example, § 1028(a)(7) makes it a federal crime 
to “knowingly transfer . . . or use[], without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, . . . any 
unlawful activity [that violates Federal, State, or local law],” where “means of 
communication” explicitly includes telecommunication identifying information.  Id. 
§ 1028(a)(7); see also The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A (2006) (imposing heightened penalties for aggravated identity theft when a 
defendant commits identify theft in relation to a variety of felony offenses). 
 249. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)–(b) (2006). 
 250. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). 
 251. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2006). 
 252. 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006). 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the conviction of a Social Security Administration teleservices agent who 
accessed the SSA database to obtain information about women in whom he was 
HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:08 PM 
2012] A VAGUE LAW IN A SMARTPHONE WORLD 1581 
when the end result is only slightly more targeted advertisements on a 
cell phone app to which some users take offense,254 imposing criminal 
and civil liability does not comport with either the intent of the 
statute or sound public policy.  
C. Proposed Amendments to the CFAA 
After sixteen years without substantive change and numerous 
conflicting judicial opinions, the CFAA is ripe for amendments aimed 
at limiting its scope and clarifying its ambiguities. Amidst growing 
concerns that the CFAA is overbroad and vague, the 112th Congress 
considered proposed amendments to the CFAA.255  In September 
2011, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the 
Grassley/Franken Amendment to Senator Leahy’s Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act to change the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” in § 1030(e)(6).256 Specifically, the proposed 
amendment would strike the word “alter” and insert the following: 
alter, but does not include access in violation of a contractual 
obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms 
of service agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet 
website, or non-government employer, if such violation constitutes 
the sole basis for determining that access to a protected computer 
is unauthorized.257 
The Bono Mack amendment introduced as part of the SECURE IT 
Act mirrors this language verbatim.258  These amendments appear to 
add much needed clarity to the “exceeds authorized access” 
                                                          
romantically interested, and then pursued those women through disquieting phone 
calls or unannounced home visits); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373–
75 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, a Russian 
hacker, who allegedly violated the CFAA by stealing network passwords and 
attempting to extort money from the company in exchange for making their network 
secure again). 
 254. See In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 106865, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (describing allegations that 
defendants “exploit[ed]” purportedly personal information for “advertising and 
analytics purposes”). 
 255. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 10–12 
(2011) (discussing the amendments proposed by Senator Grassley and Senator 
Leahy on September 15 and November 17, 2011, respectively).  In addition, 
Representative Bono Mack introduced a similar bill in the United States House of 
Representatives.  Strengthening and Enhancing Cybersecurity by Using Research, 
Education, Information, and Technology Act of 2012 (SECURE IT Act of 2012), 
H.R. 4263, 112th Cong. (introduced Mar. 27, 2012 by Rep. Bono Mack). 
 256. See S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 11–12 (discussing the five proposed amendments to 
the Act as amended by the Senate Commission on the Judiciary). 
 257. Id. at 43. 
 258. Compare S. REP. NO. 112-90, at 10–12 (2011) (incorporating the Grassley 
amendment over the Leahy amendment), with SECURE IT Act of 2012, H.R. 4263, 
112th Cong. (recommending identical language). 
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definition and essentially prevent the Department of Justice from 
pursuing the Drew-type litigation.  By specifically excluding violations 
of written access agreements that form the sole basis for determining 
access, the amendments appear to solve the core overbreadth and 
vagueness issues that plague the contract-based approach by 
removing the possibility of criminalizing a breach of contract.259  
Moreover, these amendments take the power of determining the line 
for criminal liability away from drafters of often arbitrary or 
nonsensical terms of use policies.  In other words, these small 
amendments remove the potential for prosecuting ordinary Internet 
usage as felonies. 
In November 2011, Senator Leahy introduced a revised 
amendment that would rewrite § 1030(A)(2) by defining the specific 
types of information that would have to be obtained in excess of 
authorization in order to trigger liability.260  Specifically, the 
amendment would create liability only when the offense “involves” 
certain types of personally identifiable information, including 
“government-issued identification numbers . . . trade secrets, 
commercial business information, or other similar information.”261  
This amendment, though aimed at providing broader protections for 
personal data, does not seem to address the core issues of 
overbreadth and vagueness.  The use of phrases such as “involve” and 
“other similar information” likely will not provide sufficient clarity 
and may lead to further confusion.262  While limiting liability to only 
specific types of information may be a valid way of solving the 
frivolous prosecution problem, the Leahy amendment attempts to 
                                                          
 259. See Bill Tweaked in Senate:  Terms of Service No Longer Terms of Felony, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/joshua-
gruenspecht/169senate-tweaks-bill-terms-service-no-longer-terms-felony (discussing 
how the revised bill would remove “contractual fine print . . . criminal liability,” but 
noting that several senators suggested an alternate approach involving a revision of 
DOJ guidelines for such cases instead of a statutory fix). 
 260. See supra note 255 (discussing proposed bills in the House and the Senate).  
Senator Leahy’s amendments were loosely based on a proposal by Professor Kerr 
articulated during House testimony.  See Cyber Security:  Protecting America’s New 
Frontier:  Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6–8 (Nov. 15, 2011) 
(testimony of Orin S. Kerr) (advocating for the Grassley/Franken amendment while 
also proposing an alternative, though more restricted, version of the Leahy 
amendment). 
 261. Orin Kerr, My Assessment of Senator Leahy’s Proposed Amendment to the CFAA, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/11/22/my-
assessment-of-senator-leahys-proposed-amendment-to-the-cfaa/. 
 262. See id. (arguing that while the idea of limiting the type of liability-triggering 
information is “sensible,” the Leahy amendment uses overly broad and ambiguous 
language that not only may raise more interpretive problems than it solves, but also 
that it fails to expressly prohibit the prosecution of Drew-type terms of service 
violations). 
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expand personal data protections to cover too many issues under one 
umbrella.263   
The recent legislative activity surrounding the CFAA demonstrates, 
at least in part, congressional recognition that the decades-old anti-
hacking statue is in need of a face-lift.  Although the Leahy 
amendment arguably raises more problems than it solves, it 
represents a step in the right direction towards limiting the scope of 
arguably vague provisions.  
CONCLUSION 
The CFAA has broken free of its moorings as an anti-hacking law 
and now sits on the precipice of becoming an oppressively broad 
statute when applied to mobile app cases.  Application of the 
contract- and agency-based approaches raises vagueness concerns 
involving both fair notice and the potential for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.  Concurrently, the under-inclusive code-
based approach blurs the CFAA’s clear distinction between insider 
and outsider liability.  Accordingly, courts should limit “without 
authorization” liability to traditional hacking cases to promote the 
original intent of the statute, while “exceeds authorized access” 
claims should be similarly limited to instances of serious misuse of 
information.  Moreover, absent congressional or judicial clarification, 
specific problems such as children’s privacy, identity theft, or mobile 
messaging are better addressed through more highly-targeted and 
narrowly-tailored statutes. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the scope of unauthorized 
access, lawmakers and regulators continue to propose CFAA 
amendments to impose increasingly harsh penalties.264  Raising 
penalties, including making it easier for law enforcement to bring 
felony charges, without first addressing the underlying vagueness 
concerns and definitional ambiguities, is a recipe for arbitrary 
enforcement.265  Even as these proposals percolate through Congress, 
                                                          
 263. See id. (discussing how the inclusion of “trade secrets” in the Leahy 
amendment has the potential to circumvent the intent requirement for trade secret 
theft liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1832). 
 264. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. REP. NO. 112-91, at 13–14 
(2011) (proposing harsher penalties for specific crimes, such as password-trafficking, 
but also attempting to carve out a prosecutorial exemption for violations of website 
terms of service agreements that form the sole basis of an unauthorized access 
claim). 
 265. See Remarks of Orin Kerr, Federalist Society Cybersecurity Symposium (June 
28, 2011), available at http://volokh.com/2011/07/05/federalist-society-symposium-
on-cybersecurity/ (criticizing proposed CFAA amendments as opening a Pandora’s 
box for law enforcement to bring unauthorized access cases on a whim). 
HERNACKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:08 PM 
1584 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1543 
several lawmakers have recognized the problems inherent in applying 
the current state of the CFAA to mobile applications.266   
As mobile apps present new challenges of data privacy for end-
users, app developers, and law enforcement, courts can adopt a 
narrower interpretation of unauthorized access limited to instances 
of hacking or serious misuse of user-data until Congress offers more 
highly tailored legislation.  In the interim, causes of action against 
mobile app developers and advertisers should fail under any current 
interpretation of “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized 
access” absent evidence of hacking or serious information misuse.  By 
limiting the scope of CFAA liability through narrow interpretations, 
courts can avoid vagueness concerns and potentially limitless liability 
for the mobile data field. 
 
                                                          
 266. See Letter from United States Sens. Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal to 
Assistant Att’y Gen. Breuer (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://franken.senate.gov/ 
files/letter/041112_Franken_Blumenthal_Letter_AG_Breuer_CFAA.pdf (“Because 
many smartphone apps lack privacy policies, many of the applications being 
investigated by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office may fall into this legal gray area.”). 
